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THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.
Some years ago an attempt was made in the YALE LAW
JOURNAL* to ascertain the meaning of the term, "citizens of the
United States." Recent political events have given that sub-
ject a new importance, and they are also such as to suggest
an inquiry into what is denoted by another and still more
important phrase of the Constitution, though used but once-
that of "the People of the United States."
The preamble of the Constitution speaks in their name, and
must be the text for any paper which aims to state what they
are, and what may be their powers. It reads thus:
"We, the People of the United States, in order to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tran-
quillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America."
The Declaration of Independence was made by "the repre-
sentatives of the United States of America in General Congress
Assembled," but in the name and by the authority of the
good people of certain "United Colonies" which, it was thereby
asserted, "are and of right ought to be free and Independent
States." It proceeded from the belief that "when in the
course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to
dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with
another," they should publish "the causes which impel them
to the separation."
*Of February. 1893.
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The Articles of Confederation which constituted our original
Constitution were a compact between the States as thirteen
different and equal sovereignties. The only reference made to
the people is in the following clause of Article IV:
"The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the diferent states in this
union, the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers,
vagabonds, and fugitives from Justice excepted, shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several
states; and the people of each state shall have free ingress
and regress to and from any other state, and shall enjoy therein
all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same
duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof
respectively, provided that such restriction shall not extend so
far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any
state, to any other state of which the Owner is an inhabitant;
provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be
laid by any state on the property of the united states, or
either of them."
Each State by this article secured to its people certain privi-
leges in the other States, and no people were mentioned or
included other than those of the several States respectively, or
the free inhabitants of each.*
When the Constitution of the United States speaks of the
people of the United States, does it refer to any who are not
the people of a particular State?
At the time when the Articles of Confederation were framed,
in 1777, and also when they received the assent of the last state
(Maryland), in 1781, the United States as a whole owned no ter-
ritory whatever except such as they might have acquired by
capture of military posts during the Revolutionary War. The
first cession by the States of any western territory was that
made by New York on March I, 1781, a month after Maryland
had passed her act to authorize the ratification of the articles
by her delegates, and in immediate connection with their
actually affixing their signatures to the document.j
There were, therefore, none in x781 that belonged to the
United States who did not also belong to a particular State.
The few frontiersmen in Tennessee, or "Franklin," belonged to
North Carolina, those of Kentucky to Virginia, those in Ohio to
New York or Connecticut.
*If this article is to be literally construed, a free inhabitant of any state,
whether one of its citizens or not, could claim the privileges of a free citizen
in any other state, an anomalous regulation commented on in the Federalist,
No. 42. See Chief Justice Taney's remarks on this subject, and also those of
Mr. Justice Curtis, in Scott v. Sandford, ig How. 419, 584.
t Journals of Congress, VII, 33, 38, 48.
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In 1787, when our present Constitution was framed, circum-
stances had changed. The United States, as a whole, now held
sovereignty over large stretches of thinly settled western terri-
tory, and future acquisitions in other directions were contem-
plated as not improbable. There were, therefore, then those
who might claim to be among its people and yet were domiciled
beyond the limits of any State. Did the Constitution speak, in
part, in their name ?
It will assist in answering this question to consider from
whom it proceeded. Its vitality depended on the ratification of
at least nine States. That of each was to be given by the vote
of a convention of delegates chosen for that purpose by its peo-
ple. No one could vote for delegates who was not a settled
inhabitant of a State. In like manner, the amendment of the
Constitution could be accomplished by the consent of those rep-
resenting the people of three-fourths of the States; and thus
only. Evidently, therefore, the ultimate constituents of the
United States originally were and ever have been those who
were inhabitants of some particular State. They were the ones,
in the language of Mr. Justice Wilson in Chisholm v. Georgia,
who spoke the United States into existence.
"They were the citizens of thirteen States, each of which
had a separate Constitution and government, and all of which
were connected together by Articles of Confederation. To the
purposes of public strength and felicity, that confederacy was
'totally inadequate. A requisition on the several States ter-
minated its legislative authority: Executive or Judicial author-
ity it had none. In order, therefore, to form a more perfect
union, to establish justice, to insure domestic tranquillity, to
provide for common defense, and to secure the blessings of lib-
erty, those people, among whom were the people of Georgia,
ordained and established the present Constitution." *
A year or two before, he had defined the term "people of
the United States" in much the same way, while explaining the
nature of our government, in the capacity of Professor of Law
in the College of Philadelphia, where he filled the first chair of
that science established in this country. His statement there
was this:
"The people of the United States must be considered
attentively in two very different views-as forming one nation,
great and united; and as forming at the same time a number of
separate States, to that nation subordinate, but independent as
to their own interior government." t
* Chisholm v. I-Teorgia, 2 Dallat 462, 463.
f Wilson's Works, II, 7, Andrews' Ed.
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Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the Supreme Court in the
Dred Scott case, had occasion to consider the correspondence
between the people and the citizens of the United States, and
described it as follows:
"The words ' people of the United States' and ' citizens' are
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both de-
scribe the political body who, according to our republican insti-
tutions, form the sovereignty and who hold the power and con.
duct the government through their representatives. They are
what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citi-
zen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this
sovereignty."* * * * "It is true, every person and every class
and description of persons who were at the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution recognized as citizens in the several
States, became also citizens of this new political body, but none
other; it was formed by them and for them and their posterity,
but for no one else. And the personal rights and privileges
guaranteed to citizens of this new sovereignty were intended
to embrace those only who were then members of the several
State communities, or who should afterwards by birthright or
otherwise become members, according to the provisions of the
Constitution and the principles on which it was founded."t
* * * "The brief preamble sets forth by whom it was
formed, for what purposes, and for whose benefit and protection.
It declares that it is formed by the peo.ple of the United States;
that is to say, by those who were members of the different
political communities in the several States; and its great object
is declared to be to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves
and their posterity. It speaks in general terms of the people of
the United States, and of citizens of the several States when it is
providing for the exercise of the powers granted or the priv-
ileges secured to the citizen. It does not define what descrip-
tion of persons are intended to be included under these terms,
or who shall be regarded as a citizen and one of the people. It
uses them as terms so well understood that no further descrip-
tion or definition was necessary."
Chief Justice Chase used quite similar language in discussing
the citizenship of women, and its political effect.
"Looking at the Constitution itself we find that it was or-
dained and established by ' the people of the United States,'
and then going further back, we find that these were the people
of the several States that had before dissolved the political
bands which connected them with Great Britain, and assumed a
separate and equal station among the powers of the earth, and
that had by Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, in
which they took the name of ' the United States of America,'
*Scott v. Sandford, x9 How. 404.
tIbid., 406.
t Ibid., 410.
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entered into a firm league of friendship with each other for
their common defense, the security of their liberties and their
mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each
other against all force offered to or attack made upon them, or
any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any
other pretense whatever. Whoever, then, was one of the people
of either of these States when the Constitution of the United
States was adopted, became itsofacto a citizen-a member of the
nation created by its adoption." *
That instrument grants certain of the rights and powers of
sovereignty and reserves the rest. A reservation even in the
technical law of real estate could not be made in favor of a
stranger. The IXth and Xth Amendments, which declare that
"the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people," and that "the powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people," ob-
viously refer to the same people who created the Constitution.
Nothing is "retained," as this word is here used, except by that
people which parted with something. These were the aggre-
gate of the people of the several States. They had stripped the
States of certain attributes of sovereignty and given them to
the United States. They only could have done this.
The people of the United States granted certain legislative
powers to a body consisting of two chambers. One was to
represent them, and the other the States. The members of the
House were to be "chosen every second year by the people of
the several States," t acting through certain electors, and each
State was always to "have at least one representative" I and top
dictate what should be the qualifications of the electors.
If, then, we may assume that the "people of the United
States," who are the ultimate depositary and source of political
power, are the sum of the men, women and children belonging to
each of the several States, excluding only "Indians not taxed," §
there is a familiar rule of construction that may help us to get
at the meaning of the term "people" as used in the Ist, IId and
IVth Amendments. It is that a word used more than once in
any document shall be presumed always to be used in the same
sense, if a reasonable effect can thus be given it, and the con-
text does not lead to a different conclusion.
*Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 16z. x66, 167. Cf. White v. Hart, iS
Wall. 650.
tArt. . Sec. 2.
t Art. i, See. 3.
§ XIVth Amendment, See. 2.
2
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The first amendment forbids Congress from "abridging
* * * the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances." The
second declares that "a well regulatecd militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed." The fourth provides that
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated."
Here certain rights are enumerated as belonging to the
people and perpetually secured to them. They are rights which
can only exist in favor of those living under a form of civil
government. The people, who had them, must then have
belonged to " a free State,"--to a government to which petitions
could be addressed, and by which searches and seizures could
be authorized.* In putting themselves under the power also of
another government for certain purposes, they proposed that
these particular rights should be secured against any possible
infringement by this new sovereign.
If we read these amendments as using in each case the word
"people" as equivalent to the term "all the people of the sev-
eral States," the meaning thus derived is a reasonable and
sensible one. If not thus confined, it might lead to serious
inconveniences of administration, and even to danger to the
* public safety. The second certainly could not be read as
extending to aliens not forming part of the people of any State.
They could not expect to be members of a well-regulated militia
organized for its protection. The exclusion or deportation of
aliens is also a right of every sovereign, and may be accom-
plished by searches and seizures which would be clearly unrea-
sonable in case of a peaceable citizen.t Our recent extension
of territory by including Hawaii has probably made all the
natives of that country citizens of the United States. They are
not, however, and probably never will be, the people of a state.
Would it be wise to invest them with a right to bear arms,
which they never enjoyed by force of a similar guaranty, under
their former government? We may incorporate Puerto Rico
and the Philippines. Would it be safe to extend to all their
population these immunities which Americans rightfully claim
as their proper birthright?
It was Jefferson's view that the first Amendment made the
free exercise of religion, as to all persons, citizens or not, "inde-
*United States v. Cruikshank. 92 United States Reports, 542 551
tThe Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U. S. 581.
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pendent of the powers of the general government;"* and the
practice of the nation has always been in conformity with this
opinion.j This particular provision, however, is quite distinct
from that respecting the right of assembly and petition. The
former might well be of universal force; and yet the latter apply
only to the people who were represented in the government to
which they might look for a redress of grievances.
The right of petition, of bearing arms, of keeping one's house
as his castle, and of immunity from arbitrary arrest, are all
political, rather than mere civil rights. Where men were looked
at simply as men, and their security against the improper exer-
cise of the powers of government regarded apart from their
political condition, as in the IIId, Vth, VIth, VITth, VIIIth and
XIIIth Amendments, and in parts of the Ist and XIVth, appro-
priate language is used, and the constitutional guaranties
plainly made of universal application.1
In the Dred Scott case, Chief Tustice Taney declared that the
citizens of our territories were entitled to all the privileges
and immunities guarantied by the bill of rights. § The attention
of the court, however, was not drawn to any distinction
between provisions for the people of the United States and pro-
visions for persons generally, without reference to their politi-
cal relations or allegiance.
It is a subtle distinction, but I am inclined to think that it is
a real one, which would be found of substantial service should
the Senate ratify the Spanish treaty as it stands.
Nor is it without foundation in the reason of things.
Every people looks primarily to its own benefit. Among
the members of its own body there are differences of right and
power. The sovereign people exercises its sovereignty through
a small part of its number, generally not more than one in four,
to whom it confides the electoral power; and they in turn select
a few to represent all in making and executing the laws. The
women and children are thus represented, not less than those
* Second Inaugural Address, Richardson's Messages and Papers of the
Presidents. I, 379.
tUnited States Revised Statutes, Sec. i8gz; Reynolds v. United States
98 United States Reports, 145, 162.
tYack Wo v. Hopkins, z8 United States Reports, 356, 369. This subject
has been discussed by the writer in a paper read before the American His.
torical Association parts of which are published in the Harvard Law Review
for January, r899, in an article by him, to which this is complemental.
§ Scott v. Sanford. i9 Howard's Reports, 449, 450. See also Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 347.
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who cast the votes at the election; but did they possess the
elective franchise, their choice might often fall on different
men.
While those who are alithorized to speak for the people may
be presumed to intend to do nothing which would not be for the
interests of the people, it is not equally true that they must be
presumed to intend to act also for the good of all mankind.
Every government is organized selfishness. It is constituted
for the good of its constituents. The preamble of the Constitu-
tion of the United States states this explicitly as the object of
its adoption. It is the embodiment of a scheme devised by the
people of the United States to form a more perfect union of
States then imperfectly united, to establish justice among
themselves, to insure their domestic tranquillity, to provide for
their own defense, to promote their own welfare, and to secure
the blessings of liberty, not to the world at large, but to them-
selves and their posterity.
It is the -ssertion of some political philosophers, that every
nation is a moral person. If this form of legal fiction, so liable
to abuse and perversion under sentimental or ecclesiastical
influences, can ever be usefully employed to determine the
duties of a people towards other peoples, it can have but a
limited and doubtful application to such a government as that
of the United States. The States are moral persons, each for
itself, in a far closer sense than the United States can ever be.
Their sovereign power extends over a much wider field. Their
history, as respects the older ones, has been largely a religious
history. Some of them have had religious establishments, and
it is not beyond the range of possibility that some may have
them again. Their legislatures make appropriations from the
public treasury, and authorize them on the part of municipal
corporations, in many cases which could not be justified under
the powers intrusted to the Congress of the United States.
The older States, or some of them, once owned large tracts
of territory outside their settled limits. They ceded it to the
United States for the benefit of all the States which were or
might thereafter be so united, that is, of the people of those
States, in their aggregated character as the people of the United
States. It seems to be thus that the Supreme Court of the
United States regarded them, in its opinion in one of the lead-
ing cases coming up from Utah, in the course of the long strug-
gle of Congress, against polygamy.
"The people of the United States, as sovereign owners of
the national territories, have supreme power over them and
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their inhabitants. In the exercise of this sovereign dominion
they are represented by the government of the United States,
to whom all the powers of government over that subject have
been delegated, subject only to such restrictions as are ex-
pressed in the Constitution, or are necessarily implied in its
terms, or in the purposes and objects of the power itself; for it
may well be admitted in respect to this, as to every power of
society over its members, that it is not absolute and unlim-
ited."' * * * "The right of local self-government, as known
to our system as a constitutional franchise, belongs, under the
Constitution, to the States and to the people thereof, by whom
that Constitution was ordained, and to whom by its terms all
power not conferred by it upon the government of the United
States was expressly reserved. The personal and civil rights
of the inhabitants of the Territories are secured to them, as to
other citizens, by the principles of constitutional liberty which
restrain all the agencies of government, State and national;
their political rights are franchises which they hold as privi-
leges in the legislative discretion of the Congress of the United
States." *
Under this construction of the Constitution, the people of
the United States, acting through the legislative powers of the
United States, could forbid the people of any of our new acqui-
sitions to assemble for purposes of. political discussion; to peti-
tion our government for a redress of grievances; to keep arms;
or to bear them; and could provide for searches and seizures of
their persons, houses, papers and effects, in modes that would
be unreasonable and illegal if employed as to those belonging
to any of our States. It is not improbable that such prohibitions
and provisions will be quite necessary in dealing with the
inhabitants of these possessions, and the power to resort to
them may afford a new instance of the wise foresight of those
in the first Congress who put our national bill of rights in form.
SIMEON E. BALDWIN.
Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 United States Reports, 44.
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